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Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 37, No. 3, October 2006
DELEUZE AND MERLEAU-PONTY:
IMMANENCE, UNIVOCITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY
JACK REYNOLDS AND JON ROFFE
Introduction
Essays that employ a ‘compare and contrast’ methodology can be tedious,
sometimes even spurious, but they can also produce a third event that is more
than merely the sum of its parts. It is particularly worthwhile to try for that in
regard to the work of Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, because of myriad
oppositions that surround and confound their reception: most obviously, the
too prevalent post-structuralist vs. phenomenologist paradigm (which is also
often accompanied by an epochal successor/predecessor pre-determination of
the substance of any argument), but also the bifurcation between philosophers
of transcendence and philosophers of immanence that it has been argued
afflicts contemporary European thought.1 In this latter respect, Deleuze, who
is heavily indebted to Spinoza and Nietzsche, and advocates pure immanence
and poststructuralist ‘difference’, is considered to be on one side of the
paradigm, whereas the sometimes existentialist (read transcendence) and
phenomenologist of consciousness (read sameness), Merleau-Ponty, is on the
other. While there is some truth to both of these broad sketches as a means of
understanding aspects of contemporary European philosophy, they are far
more problematic when Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty are taken as sitting on
opposing sides. Ultimately we will argue that something like a coexistence of
planes2 obtains between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty, notwithstanding some
initial appearances to the contrary and the fact that there has been very little
secondary work examining their inter-relation.3
This paper will seek firstly to understand Deleuze’s main challenges to
phenomenology (which are at least as cutting as Derrida’s more famous and
prolonged engagement with phenomenology), particularly as they are
expressed in The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition. We will then
turn to a discussion of one of the few passages in which Deleuze and Guattari
directly engage with Merleau-Ponty, which occurs in the chapter on art in
What is Philosophy? In this text, he and Guattari offer a critique of what they
call the “final avatar” of phenomenology – that is, the “fleshism” that Merleau-
Ponty proposes in his unfinished but justly famous work, The Visible and the
Invisible. It will be argued that both Deleuze’s basic criticisms of
phenomenology, as well as he and Guattari’s problems with the concept of the
flesh, do not adequately come to grips with Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy.
Merleau-Ponty is not obviously partisan to what Deleuze finds problematic in
this tradition, despite continuing to identify himself as a phenomenologist, and
228
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
10
.22
.99
.72
] a
t 1
6:3
1 2
7 M
ay
 20
15
 
is working within a surprisingly similar framework in certain key respects. In
fact, in the more positive part of this paper, we will compare Merleau-Ponty’s
notion of flesh, and Deleuze’s equally infamous univocity of being, as a means
to consider the broader question of the ways in which the two philosophers
consider ontological thought, its meaning and its conditions. It is our argument
that through properly understanding both positions, a rapprochement, or at
least the foundation for one, can be established between these two important
thinkers.
1. The Logic of Sense: Deleuze’s Critique of Phenomenology and the
Problem of the Urdoxa
While Deleuze has written on phenomenology in many of his key texts, his
negotiation with this tradition has tended to involve allusive and somewhat
sweeping comments that tie his critique of phenomenology to problems that
he sees with Kant. In The Logic of Sense, however, his engagement with
phenomenology is quite detailed and he introduces a term that will play a
fundamental role in his characterisation of phenomenology: that being doxa,
which is, of course, the Greek term for opinion. Now it needs to be
acknowledged from the outset that phenomenology, at least on first
appearances, would appear to resist doxa to a greater extent than any previous
philosophy. Phenomenology espouses a rejection of, or at least a withdrawal
from, the so-called ‘natural attitude’, which assumes that there is an outside
world and other people. In its place, phenomenology argues that philosophy
must attend to experience, and do away with theoretical presuppositions. On
Deleuze’s understanding, however, phenomenology inevitably reinstates what
he calls an ur-doxa, or a higher doxa. In order to show this, he proceeds by first
delineating two main forms of doxa, good sense and common sense, in some
detail. These two forms mutually depend upon one another and in all of
Deleuze’s discussions of phenomenology in other texts these terms recur. 
1a. Good Sense
According to Deleuze’s analysis, good sense is always derivative, and
doubly so. What we consider to be the basic level of meaning both in
experience (understood phenomenologically) and more narrowly in language,
is in fact the product of a more fundamental structure: that is, Deleuze argues
that sense emerges from a primary nonsense. In turn, the postulation of an
originary meaningfulness in experience is traced by Deleuze back to a set of
unjustified presuppositions. Sense, generated out of this multifarious regime of
nonsense, is not simple, but always takes on two opposed directions at one and
the same time. Confronting Husserl with Lewis Carroll, Deleuze suggests that
what appears to be univocally meaningful in sense, in fact also lends itself to
other meanings, even opposed ones. This bivocality of sense is borne witness
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to by the phenomenon of paradox, to which Deleuze accords a transcendental
importance. Paradox is an ineradicable part of the production of sense and
should not simply be understood as the result of an empirical misuse of
language, or a misappropriation of logic. It is, Deleuze states, the “perpetuum
mobile”4 of the production of sense; paradox constitutes the shuttling
movement within nonsense which produces sense. The whole project of a logic
of sense, Deleuze argues, is to come to terms with this original relation of sense
and non-sense, which would take into account the role that paradox plays
without falling back into any analogy with the true/false distinction that robs
paradox of its intrinsic role, and posits the primacy of a good sense originarily
oriented towards truth (LS 68). In this respect, the most basic aspect of
Deleuze’s criticism of phenomenology is that it assumes a world primordially
impregnated with univocal meaning – good sense – an assumption that no true
transcendental philosophy could countenance. In fact, he suggests that we must
invert this phenomenological picture to approach the real structure of sense. 
It also needs to be noted that good sense is essentially distributive. Deleuze
suggests that the comment “on the one hand, on the other hand” is its formula
(LS 75). It starts from massive differentiation and then resolves, or synthesises
it,5 and it is the supposition of good sense that makes possible the lesser form
of dialectical thinking that Deleuze spent his career, and particularly
Difference and Repetition, trying to avoid. Although Deleuze does not want to
simply reject dialectics (in fact this book outlines an alternative dialectic to
that of Hegel), any dialectical thought that annuls or overcomes difference is
to be rejected; what is required on the other hand, is the affirmation of
paradox, rather than the synthesising of the terms involved and a concomitant
resolution of the contradiction.
Questions regarding the extent to which Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical
project admits of the dialectic become relevant here. In The Visible and the
Invisible, he distinguishes his conception of the dialectic from the ‘bad’
dialectical thinking that he characterises as a “preponderant force that always
works in the same direction”,6 much as good sense does for Deleuze. More
positively, Merleau-Ponty also proposes a more sophisticated form of
dialectical thinking, which he terms the hyper-dialectic (and synonymously
‘hyper-reflection’), and characterises as follows:
What we call hyper-dialectic is a thought that, on the contrary, is capable of reaching truth
because it envisages without restriction the plurality of the relationships and what has been
called ambiguity. The bad dialectic is that which thinks it recomposes being by a thetic
thought, by an assemblage of statements, by thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; the good dialectic
is that which is conscious of the fact that every thesis is an idealisation, that Being is not made
up of idealisations or of things said... but of bound wholes where signification never is except
in tendency (VI 94).
Above all, the hyper-dialectic is a refusal of what Merleau-Ponty calls
“high-altitude thinking”, which surveys proceedings from some transcendent
230
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
10
.22
.99
.72
] a
t 1
6:3
1 2
7 M
ay
 20
15
 
position above, ignorant of the questioner’s involvement and co-implication in
that which is being questioned. It is also important to note that his hyper-
dialectic involves no ultimate synthesis of differences and the terms of the
opposition are not reified. It hence appears that what Deleuze calls ‘good
sense’ might not play an important role in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, and this
manner in which his version of the dialectic is not parasitic upon the
presupposition of good sense also applies to the strategy of deconstruction.
Although deconstruction arguably begins with and depends upon an “on the
one hand, on the other hand” methodology – the formula of good sense – it
does not then proceed to less differentiation; on the contrary the two ‘hands’
of the opposition become intertwined and contaminated with one another. 
On Deleuze’s analysis, however, phenomenology is compromised to its
core by a presupposed commitment to an orderly, intrinsic and natural
meaningfulness. As a result, phenomenology must be criticised for excluding
in an unjustifiably a priori manner many decisive subjective experiences,
notably those of the mad and those connected to the unconscious: in other
words, it must be criticised for remaining within the presumptive and artificial
enclosure of good sense. In short, as Deleuze states in Difference and
Repetition, “The whole of phenomenology is an epiphenomenology” (DR 52).
Whether or not this is necessarily the case in regard to Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology, however, is not so clear. After all, even if it might be claimed
that conscious experience is the starting-point of phenomenology, experience
nevertheless shades off into less conscious phenomena and admits of
ambiguity, as well as to phenomena like habituality, which are conditions for
so-called ‘conscious’ experience. This, of course, is something that Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology, both early and late, examines in detail.
1b. Common Sense and the Urdoxa
Common sense, on the other hand, is described by Deleuze as “a faculty of
identification that brings diversity in general under the form of the same” (LS
77-8). It identifies, recognises, and subsumes various diverse faculties of the
soul (or singularities, to use Deleuze’s term) and gives them a unity that is
capable of saying ‘I’. On this view, the subject is a product of common sense
and one of Deleuze’s ongoing problems with phenomenology is this unified
subject that it presupposes (the form that imposes common sense). As he will
more explicitly argue with Guattari in What is Philosophy?, instead of
attaining to the pure immanence that is its goal in the dominant Husserlian
sense, phenomenology focuses upon the immanence of experience relative to
the horizons of a transcendental subject, and thus, on Deleuze’s view,
fundamentally undermines immanence. We will examine this point in more
detail shortly, but in Difference and Repetition Deleuze is more specific about
the nature of the common sense that he thinks afflicts phenomenology:
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Far from overturning the form of commonsense, Kant merely multiplied it. Must not the same
be said of phenomenology? Does it not discover a fourth common sense, this time grounded
upon sensibility as a passive synthesis – one which, even though it constitutes an Ur-doxa,
remains no less prisoner of the form of doxa? (DR 137; cf. LS 98) 
Interestingly, in the footnote to this comment (n 6, chapter 3) Deleuze
claims that Merleau-Ponty diagnoses the same problem with common sense
(the persistence of the model of recognition), although diagnosing the problem
does not entail that Merleau-Ponty necessarily avoids it and we will come back
to this question. While Deleuze’s discussions of passive synthesis in this text
are long and detailed, to put his point bluntly the problem with both Kant’s
critical philosophy and Husserlian phenomenology is that they assume that
sensibility is natively apposite to every form of experience. The subject is in
advance predisposed to the structure of experience (common sense), and
experience is always structured meaningfully in advance (good sense). What
he refers to as an urdoxa is thus the presupposition of a perfect fit, or a natural
harmony, between self and world (LS 78), and, for Deleuze, phenomenology
is powerless to break with this urdoxa of the union between good sense and
common sense (LS 97). Despite his avowed targets here being Kant and, in a
more fundamental sense, Husserl,7 elsewhere Deleuze informs us that the bulk
of modern philosophy, including Descartes, Hegel, etc., are all powerless to
break with the ‘everybody knows’ of good sense and common sense. In
relation to Husserl specifically, Deleuze’s claim is that without the
transcendental privilege accorded to the subject (common sense) there would
be no unity and good sense itself would also break down. He suggests that
phenomenology is a philosophy that conserves a certain essential form, in that
“the entire dimension of manifestation is given ready-made, in the position of
a transcendental subject, which retains the form of the person, of
consciousness, and of subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating
the transcendental out of the characteristics of the empirical”.8
As we will see, in What is Philosophy? he and Guattari contend that this
move of finding transcendence within immanence is an archetypal modern one
that, on the ontological level, they find suspect. The positive ontology that
support this view will soon be considered, but Deleuze credits Sartre’s earlier
analysis of Husserl in The Transcendence of the Ego with discovering this
‘pure immanence’ of the transcendental field. In this text, Sartre shows how
phenomenology should not posit a transcendental ego that is inside all
experience; any ego is literally transcendent to, or not part of phenomeno-
logical experience, which involves nothing more than what Sartre calls non-
thetic self-awareness (we are indirectly aware that we are not that object that
we are intending or negating). At the same time, Deleuze thinks that there is
no value in insisting upon the priority of consciousness (as Sartre does), since
consciousness always makes reference to “synthes[es] of unification” (LS
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102) and ends up reintroducing a type of ontological transcendence. On this
analysis, Sartre betrays his discovery of the immanence of the transcendental
field by reintroducing the form, if not the content (since, for Sartre,
consciousness has no content and is literally no-thing-ness), of the subject in
its Cartesian-Husserlian formulation. 
On Deleuze’s analysis, phenomenology cannot actually return to pure
immanence because it conserves the form of consciousness within the
transcendental, and retains the forms of good sense and common sense, which
are produced rather than originary. A more radical reduction would have to
leave consciousness behind (just as Merleau-Ponty’s work ultimately does)
and instead reveal an impersonal and pre-individual transcendental field that
cannot be determined as consciousness, along the lines of that found by Sartre
but without reinstating the individual or the subject on another level (LS 99).9
This transcendental field is neither individual or personal, nor general or
universal. Instead, he turns to the enumeration of what he calls singularities,10
and anti-generalities, which are impersonal and pre-individual and preside
over the genesis of sense.11 What Deleuze thinks needs to be discovered, we
will suggest, is something like what Merleau-Ponty in his earlier work
describes as the passive and anonymous aspect (PP 216) of the transcendental
field (and anonymity cannot simply be equated with generality, as is often
done).12 In the terms of Merleau-Ponty’s later work, it is what has variously
been called wild being, brute being, and savage being, which are the
“uncultivated and un-constituted being of the sensible” (VI xlix), an
impersonal transcendental field that cannot be understood through any
reference to subjects or objects.
2. What is Philosophy? and the Role of Pure Immanence in Deleuze’s Critique
As with most of the French poststructuralists, comments by Deleuze on his
immediate phenomenological predecessors are relatively rare. Aside from a
footnote praising Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Leibniz in The Fold,13 and some
enigmatic references to him in Cinema 114 and Foucault,15 Deleuze’s only
substantial engagement with Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy takes place in What
is Philosophy?, co-authored with Guattari.16 Throughout this text, many of the
claims made in The Logic of Sense about phenomenology are replicated, even
if in a different idiom that more explicitly casts his critique around the theme
of immanence. Their focus on immanence in this text is particularly interesting
given Husserl’s own characterisation of his phenomenological method as one
of “pure immanence”. For Husserl, the negative movement of the epoché, the
initial bracketing of the ‘natural attitude’, suspends all transcendence and
opens the way for a return to things themselves; it might be said to positively
open the way for a return to immanence (albeit within consciousness). While
Husserl’s commitment to immanence might be said to be more of an
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epistemological rather than an ontological position, phenomenology is also
committed to the idea that being is phenomenon: that there is no two-world
ontology between essence and appearance.17 In taking phenomenology on in
what has traditionally been considered its own terrain, the sphere of
immanence, Deleuze’s criticisms of Husserlian phenomenology become
clearer. It is also here, ostensibly at least, that any contrast with Merleau-Ponty
seems at its most stark, notably because Merleau-Ponty actually explicitly
rejected the methodology of immanence as Husserl’s phenomenological
methodology construed it,18 rather than radicalised it, as Deleuze might be said
to do. Before considering the significance of that distinction, however, we
need to examine Deleuze and Guattari’s related notions of pure immanence
and the plane of immanence, two important emblems for what their work was
trying to achieve.
In Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, Deleuze insists that the
transcendental field cannot be defined by the consciousness that is coextensive
with it.19 In What is Philosophy? he and Guattari go into some detail
explicating the nature of the plane of immanence and they inform us that it is
something pre-philosophical that is the condition for philosophy: “If
philosophy begins with the creation of concepts, then the plane of immanence
must be regarded as pre-philosophical” (WP 40). Philosophy presupposes this
pre-philosophical plane, this transcendental field, which is one of its internal
conditions – but here, “pre-philosophical does not mean something pre-
existent but rather something that does not exist outside of philosophy but
presupposes it” (WP 41). They go on to suggest that “perhaps this is the
supreme act of philosophy: not so much to think the plane of immanence as to
show that it is there, unthought in every plane and to think it in this way as the
outside and inside of thought” (WP 59).
This conception of the plane of immanence bears some important
similarities to Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. When criticising Sartre in
The Visible and the Invisible, for example, Merleau-Ponty points out, not
unlike Deleuze, that the concepts of Being and Nothingness, and their
dialectical interplay, “ignore density, depth, the plurality of planes, the
background worlds” (VI 68). More significantly, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly
insists that we have “a contact with being prior to reflection, a contact that
makes reflection itself possible” (VI 65). This contact with being, which he
also refers to as the openness of the perceptual faith, is, however, continually
referred to as paradoxical (VI 31). While Merleau-Ponty is sometimes
criticised for what appears to be foundational appeals to the perceptual faith
and to an intimate contact with being that precedes reflection, accusations of
this sort ignore the paradoxical status of the perceptual faith, as well as
Merleau-Ponty’s insistence that the perceptual faith is a problem for us – it is
not the answer. Indeed, on his view the various difficulties that Western
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philosophers have encountered over the years can be tied to the attempt to
solve, or efface, this problem of the perceptual faith, and this is not what his
hyper-dialectic attempts to do (VI 35). If phenomenology, for Deleuze,
licenses a form of both dogmatism and relativism – doxa becomes ur-doxa and
remains on the level of common sense and the ‘everybody knows’ – for
Merleau-Ponty, the paradox that is the perceptual faith is what makes possible
both dogmatism and scepticism (VI 30), and the point remains that he is not
advocating any return to the perceptual faith. 
In order to understand the reasons behind Deleuze and Guattari’s rejection
of phenomenology, however, it is also important to note their fundamental
contention that “immanence is immanent only to itself: it is pure immanence
and it leaves nothing out to which it might be transcended” (WP 44). They
suggest that whenever immanence is interpreted as immanent to something
else, pure immanence is lost, transcendence is reintroduced (WP 45), and the
thinking in question becomes a form of religion rather than philosophy (a
point closely connected to their assertion that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the
flesh is ‘pious’ – we will return to this). Although Deleuze and Guattari
acknowledge that some kind of reconstitution of transcendence may well be
inevitable (WP 51), they clearly think that it should be minimised as much as
possible and they thematise three different kinds of transcendence that have
afflicted Western philosophy, the final of which they associate with
phenomenology. 
Firstly, there is the transcendent idea in Platonism or the transcendent
Christian God – both of which are forms of traditional metaphysics. However,
they argue that with Kant’s critique, metaphysics became discredited and it
was the sphere of consciousness that became designated as immanent and
what is outside it became transcendent – this might be the thing-in-itself, the
world, or, more commonly in contemporary discourse, the Other. Hence the
notorious phenomenological attempts at refuting solipsism and getting access
to the other who must necessarily transcend this inner subjective realm.
Arguably this is taken to its logical conclusion in the work of Lévinas, where
the alterity of the Other is wholly transcendent to the subject and never
subsumable under any version of what he calls the “imperialism of the same”,
including the subject’s many and varied projections on to, and about that,
Other.20 But this second kind of transcendence that is involved in the
subjectivist tradition, which reduces immanence to consciousness, also
contains another dimension of transcendence. This reduction to immanence
tends to be accompanied by the positing of a transcendental ego, whether it be
directly acknowledged or simply presupposed.21 As Deleuze shows in his
engagement with Kant in Difference and Repetition, it is the activity of
reflection that attributes a field of immanence to a subject. The subject who
reflects, and who contemplates, is hence at a distance from experience, or what
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we might term the empirical flux of pure immanence. In other words,
immanence becomes immanent to (in the sense that it is made possible and
revealed by) a transcendental subjectivity. 
Of Husserl, Deleuze and Guattari also write that, “he conceived of
immanence as the flux of lived experience within subjectivity, but since this
lived experience, pure and even primordial, does not belong completely to the
self that represents it to itself, it is in the regions of non-belonging that the
horizon of something transcendent is re-established” (WP 46). On their
understanding of Husserl, one is inevitably distanced from their own
experience, partly exterior to it, and this thereby installs an ego that is
transcendent to, or different from, the immanent flux of experience. Although
the phenomenological epoché appears to be a reduction to the level of
immanence, in that one switches off belief in things themselves that are
transcendent, Deleuze and Guattari argue that it continues to relate the plane
of immanence back to a subject who apprehends that immanence.
It is worth digressing to note that Merleau-Ponty shares Deleuze’s concerns
with the tendency of Husserl’s work to do precisely that, pointing out that
where Husserl does this he leaves the twofold question of the genesis of the
subject and the ‘world’ untouched (VI 45-6). On Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding, however, this was something that Husserl himself recognised
of his own work, when he acknowledged that in it every transcendental
reduction was always also simultaneously an eidetic reduction, a generalising
that subtended the particular, and he argues that Husserl altered his later work
to avoid this impasse through a more thorough thematization of the
Lebenswelt. Of course, it is a common tactic of Merleau-Ponty’s to attribute to
other philosophers his own position and he may well hence be being too
generous to Husserl, but even if that is the case, it nevertheless illuminates the
close proximity between his position and that of Deleuze, and what becomes
clear is that the question of subjectivity is very important to Deleuze’s critique
of phenomenology. On Deleuze’s view, phenomenology needs to leave behind
the subject and ask genetic questions like how is the subject constituted in the
given (ES 87). Again, this can be understood as an attempt to make the
phenomenological reduction more radical, but it is also, we argue, something
that Merleau-Ponty accomplished in The Visible and the Invisible, where he
argues, for example, that “the philosophical question is not posed in us by a
pure spectator: it is first a question as to how, upon what ground, the pure
spectator is established, from what more profound source he himself draws”
(VI 109). Merleau-Ponty denigrates this ‘high-altitude thinking’ in much the
same way as Deleuze denigrates transcendent thinking, and it seems clear that
Merleau-Ponty also wants to get to something like the plane of immanence –
the ground of the transcendental field – that is the condition of consciousness,
subjectivity and objectivity. Moreover, if we construe immanence as denoting
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relations between things that co-exist on the one level, as Deleuze does, then
ontologically this bears many similarities with Merleau-Ponty’s later
philosophy, which sought to reject the methods of both analytic reflection and
intuition that ultimately reinstated hierarchies of being. Instead, his work
sought to “install itself in a locus where they have not yet been distinguished,
in experiences that have not yet been ‘worked over’, that offer us at once, pell-
mell, both ‘subject’ and ‘object’, both existence and essence, and hence give
philosophy resources to redefine them” (VI 130). 
In regard to Husserl’s phenomenological successors (such as Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty and Lévinas), Deleuze and Guattari complicate their
fundamental claim that phenomenology construes immanence only in relation
to a subject who is distanced from, and therefore not reducible to, that
immanence. They suggest that beginning with Husserl, but more clearly with
his successors, there arises a third kind of transcendence in which “one seeks
to rediscover transcendence within the heart of immanence itself, as a breach
or interruption of its field” (WP 46). On this understanding, there is no pure
immanence: rather, there are breaches within immanence and they hence
characterise post-Husserlian phenomenology as seeking to discover
transcendence within immanence. Alternatively, this might be designated as
seeking to find transcendence in immanence, which is actually a comment that
Merleau-Ponty persistently makes regarding his own philosophical position in
the 1940s (it will be argued that what this means is not as antithetical to
Deleuze’s position as might be assumed). This version of transcendence
involves an internal disruption that is envisaged as occurring within the sphere
of immanence and it is worth observing that the eidetic reduction discovers
generalities, or transcendent essences from within particular experiences, and
it hence could be said to be the first and archetypal mode of finding
transcendence in immanence. In this respect, however, it is important to note
that chapter three of The Visible and the Invisible critiques not only Bergsonian
intuitionism, but also Husserlian eidetics. For Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology
does not grant us access to a priori essences that are true for all cultures.
Whether or not his concept of the flesh reinstates a version of transcendence
in immanence, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest it does, will be considered in
what follows. 
3. Beyond “The final avatar of phenomenology”: Deleuze and Guattari’s
Critique of the Flesh
In the chapter on art in What is Philosophy? (WP 163-199) references to
obvious Merleau-Pontyian topics and themes abound, including discussions of
the intertwining, the flesh, and the phenomenological concern with Cézanne’s
painting to which Merleau-Ponty devoted two articles.22 One of the key
engagements with phenomenology in Deleuze’s work, it also poses the most
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decisive and overt questions to Merleau-Ponty.23 The crucial passage occurs in
the context of a discussion of the relation between nature and art:
Can sensation be assimilated to an original opinion, to Urdoxa as the world’s foundation or
immutable basis? Phenomenology finds sensation in perceptual or affective ‘a priori
materials’ that transcend the perceptions and affections of the lived: Van Gogh’s yellow or
Cézanne’s innate sensations. As we have seen, phenomenology must become the
phenomenology of art because the immanence of the lived to a transcendental subject must be
expressed in transcendent functions that not only determine experience in general but traverse
the lived itself here and now, and are embodied in it by constituting living sensations (WP 178-
9). 
In this passage, Deleuze and Guattari begin by raising the same question
that was posed in The Logic of Sense concerning sense: can we account for
sensation in terms of a fundamental sympathetic basis that underlies its
relationship to a subject (that is, the Urdoxa)? Withholding their negative
response for a moment (the outline of which should be familiar by now), they
go on to enigmatically suggest that all phenomenology “must become the
phenomenology of art”. The reason why Deleuze and Guattari might claim
such a peculiar thing relies on their own understanding of art. To continue the
quotation:
The being of sensation, the bloc of percept and affect, will appear as the unity or reversibility
of feeling and felt, their intimate intermingling like hands clasped together: it is the flesh that,
at the same time, is freed from the lived body, the perceived world, and the intentionality of
one toward the other that is still too tied to experience; whereas flesh gives us the being of
sensation and bears the original opinion distinct from the judgement of experience – flesh of
the world and flesh of the body that are exchanged as correlates, ideal coincidence. A curious
Fleshism inspires this final avatar of phenomenology and plunges it into the mystery of the
incarnation. It is both a pious and a sensual notion, a mixture of sensuality and religion,
without which, perhaps, flesh could not stand up by itself… The flesh is only the thermometer
of a becoming (WP 178).
Here, Deleuze and Guattari begin by making reference to their definition of
the art-work. This definition is radically a-subjective: the work of art is a “being
of sensation”, a compound of affects and percepts, where affect is not to be
understood as the affection pertaining to a particular subject, but an ideality, a
real being that does not rely upon the subject. Likewise, “percepts are no longer
perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them [...]
Sensations, percepts and affects are beings whose validity lies in themselves
and exceeds any lives” (WP 164). Clearly this is a conception of art foreign to
phenomenology traditionally conceived, insofar as the subjective point of view
of the ego cogito is left out of the picture. Given this, the claim that
phenomenology must become phenomenology of art takes on a richer meaning
again: if art must be understood in a-subjective terms, then the phenomenology
that would attend to such experiences would a priori exclude subjectivity: a
new phenomenology that gestures to a new reduction (cf. WP 149-51). 
While Merleau-Ponty is not referred to here by name (except again in the
attached footnote), it is not difficult to see obvious references to his work,
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including the reversibility of the touched and the touching, the reference to
clasping hands, the interconnectedness of the flesh of the body and the world.
We wish to argue, though, that Deleuze and Guattari here give us evidence to
think that they have seriously underestimated the strength of Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophical position. The first thing to note here is that the description of the
flesh, one of the central concepts in Merleau-Ponty’s later work, is at best only
half accurate. His goal is indeed to describe an ontology of the intertwining,
or the chiasm. This ontology also attempts to undermine the supremacy of the
ego cogito and the theme of intentionality in phenomenological thought.
However, Merleau-Ponty would certainly baulk at Deleuze and Guattari’s
suggestion that the flesh of the body and that of the world are merely
interchangeable, “ideal coincidences” – indeed, he stresses that the reversible
coincidence that defines the flesh is always imminent and never realised (VI
147). Also, Merleau-Ponty is at pains to state that the flesh is not a fact, or sum
of facts (VI 131), and nor is it spiritual (VI 139).
In addition to these more exegetical remarks, however, three explicit
criticisms are also invoked here by Deleuze and Guattari. Firstly, that while the
concept of the flesh may do away with the supremacy of judgement in thought,
a theme intrinsic to modern philosophy since Kant’s first Critique, it still
depends upon the postulation of a pre-established harmony between self and
world (eg. an Urdoxa). Secondly, Deleuze and Guattari charge that there
remains in the concept of the flesh a kind of theological prejudice, a reference
to a veiled transcendence. As they suggest earlier in the book, with the theme
of the ‘flesh’, “the mole of the transcendent is found within immanence itself”
(WP 46). Finally, and most enigmatically, is the claim that, “flesh is only the
thermometer of a becoming.”
It is too soon to immediately judge the first two criticisms, which will hold
our attention for the rest of the paper, but the third gives us some critical
purchase with which to examine Deleuze and Guattari’s understanding of
Merleau-Ponty. The theme of becoming is a decisive one in Deleuze’s work,
and one that returns ubiquitously. Standing in the line of Heraclitus and
Nietzsche, becoming must be considered as the highest achievement of
ontological thought for Deleuze. In Difference and Repetition, a three-stage
development of univocal ontology – ontological positions that admit no
transcendence – is outlined (DR 39-41) that can guide us here, since it is
ultimately on the grounds of ontology that Deleuze wants to confront the
Merleau-Pontian position.
The first stage is embodied by the work of Duns Scotus, a champion of the
univocity of being in the face of transcendent ontology as found in scholastic
philosophy and theology. While committed to ontological univocity (which,
we might note, also entails a rejection of the urdoxa in the form of theological
presuppositions), Duns Scotus nonetheless only abstractly conceives of
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univocal being, and does not manage to make the passage from the thought to
concrete reality (DR 39-40). Now to criticise Merleau-Ponty for such a level
of abstraction would be misplaced. All of his work circles around and draws
upon the level of concrete life, from The Structure of Behaviour to The Visible
and the Invisible. Beyond this, and considering both the discussion of the
relation between everyday life and transcendental philosophy in
Phenomenology of Perception and the effort that Merleau-Ponty goes to in The
Visible and the Invisible to undermine any intellectual supererogation in
relation to existence, it would be hard to plausibly criticise Merleau-Ponty for
an abstract thought of being.
Deleuze and Guattari’s poetic claim that “flesh is only the thermometer of
a becoming” (WP 178) is critical of Merleau-Ponty in a further respect, this
time analogous to the problem that Deleuze expresses concerning Spinoza, the
second figure in the former’s three-step genealogy of univocal ontology. If
Scotus remained at the level of the abstract, Spinoza treated the univocity of
being as the object of affirmation, and thus engaged it with life, drawing
ontology down from the heights of abstract thought to an engagement with
concrete existence. However, there still remains (at least for the Deleuze
writing at this point) an a priori distinction between Being (substance, God or
Nature) and the modes through which it is expressed.24 Spinoza’s ultimate
failing is to remain insistent on a kind of transcendence of substance over its
expressions: he maintains the form of the general even if it holds no content in
and of itself (this content being provided by the modes and the modes alone).
Here Deleuze turns finally to Nietzsche’s ‘eternal return’ (of the different,
rather than the same) as an effort to return to Being that groundless movement
– in short, to the final refusal of Being in favour of becoming. More
straightforwardly, the eternal return signifies for Deleuze the primordial and
groundless univocity of Being. Disposing at last with the final cipher of the
one, or general substance, Nietzsche provides the first ontology wholly equal
to the univocity of Being. To claim, then, that “flesh is only the thermometer
of a becoming” is to claim that, as an ontological concept – and there is little
doubt that Merleau-Ponty wants to cast flesh as a concept in this register even
if he claims that he is proposing an “indirect ontology” (VI 179) – the flesh
remains unable to attain to the real level of ontological thought, which must be
founded on the regime of becoming and thus on a total rejection of a primary
transcendence or unity in all its forms. In effect, Deleuze and Guattari hence
claim that flesh refers only to the lived body, or to some kind of brute
physicality, a representative of passive substance ontology, and that Merleau-
Ponty is referring to a general conception of Being. In other words, they argue
that while flesh is a definitive advance for phenomenology, it reinstates a form
of transcendence, something that is higher than and subsumes particular
differences. In a backhanded way, then, the claim is that Merleau-Ponty thinks
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of ontology in terms of what Deleuze in Bergsonism calls, “the homogeneity
of a Being in general”.25
However, Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the flesh resists this kind of
understanding. We can begin by noting that, as Merleau-Ponty states, “the
flesh we are speaking of is not matter” (VI 139). In fact, what he intends with
this concept is much more closely related to what Deleuze thinks is the goal
of his own philosophy: to provide an analysis of the transcendental as the real
condition for actual experience (cf. VI 33, 45). As Merleau-Ponty states, in a
quote that is decisive for this discussion, the flesh is “the concrete emblem of
a general manner of being” (VI 147). A little earlier, he states that the flesh is
“a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual and the idea,
a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a
fragment of being “ (VI 139). This ‘general thing’ here should not be confused
with the Kantian object = x that is aligned by Deleuze with good sense and the
urdoxa. Rather, Merleau-Ponty is concerned to delineate a style of expression
that being as such involves: a style or a ‘texture’, in the sense that all
differences are ‘said’ in the same way, as is the case with Deleuze’s account of
the univocity of being.
4. Flesh and Univocity – An Ontological Proximity
If Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh is resistant to the criticisms Deleuze
and Guattari oppose to it in What is Philosophy?, and to this extended version
of their analysis that we have just offered, just what kind of ontology does
Merleau-Ponty have and how does it look from Deleuze’s point of view? It is
perhaps becoming clear that we consider the difference between the two
philosophers to be less significant than Deleuze himself thinks, but the
beginnings of an answer to this particular question lie in ascertaining how
Deleuze’s ontology of becoming is itself framed. Consider this justly well-
known passage from Difference and Repetition:
There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal [...] A single voice
raises the clamour of being. We have no difficulty in understanding that Being, even if it is
absolutely common, is nevertheless not a genus [...] In effect, the essential in univocity is not
that Being is said in a single and same sense, but that it is said, in a single and same sense, of
all its individuating differences or intrinsic modalities. Being is the same for all these
modalities, but these modalities are not equal (DR 35-6).
This passage has been well-remarked on by many commentators, perhaps
most notably by Alain Badiou,26 but what is crucial to note is that the univocity
of Being for Deleuze is a long way from any crude form of physical or mental
monism. It does not imply a brute physicality, in which everything must be
taken account of scientifically, and in which the self must be accounted for on
strictly physiological terms; neither, however, is the insistence on univocity
here reducible to the immanence of experience to the self in transcendental
phenomenology, à la Husserl – we are clearly beyond the sphere of subjective
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experience here. “Simple empiricism” (PI 25), idealism (transcendental or
otherwise), and transcendental phenomenology are unable, for Deleuze, to
come to terms with Being qua Being. The “sameness” referred to in the above
quote is not the monotony of a single substance, but the affirmation of
difference as such, without any reference to a prior identity.
The similarities between these claims and the arguments of The Visible
and the Invisible are striking. To repeat: the flesh is “the concrete emblem of
a general manner of being” (VI 147). Rather than expressing an abstract
thought of being that does not engage with life (like Duns Scotus), or
thinking being against the ultimate horizon of a general substance (Spinoza),
Merleau-Ponty wants to insist on a style or manner in which all beings exist.
This style is the chiasmatic intertwining of beings, an ambiguous27
invagination in which beings are engaged without being coincident or equal.
For Merleau-Ponty, flesh is expressed in the same way for all of its
individuating differences or intrinsic modalities, even though these
modalities or differences are not themselves identical, equal or
“coincidental”. Moreover, in the ‘Working Notes’, Merleau-Ponty suggests
that the flesh is the way in which all of the many and varied chiasms (such
as those between self and world, self and others, etc.) are interdependent (VI
247), and exist on the one level, again evoking Deleuze’s plane of
immanence, which can be taken as a synonym for the univocity of being.
And, as is the case with Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty is certainly not implying
here a monism as it is traditionally construed. On this primary level, which
is of supreme importance for these philosophers, we can in fact see a real
proximity. This is not to say that there are no differences between them, but
that their basic projects, and enemies, are more similar than Deleuze
suggests and than we are often led to think.
5. Tenderness and the Perceptual Faith – Ciphers of the Urdoxa in Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology?
Given this proximity, we can turn afresh to the critical issues that Deleuze
addresses to phenomenology and to its “final avatar” (WP 178), the ‘fleshism’
of Merleau-Ponty. Does Merleau-Ponty’s project manage to escape all of
Deleuze’s concerns, making him a philosopher engaged in the same basic
project, albeit well-disguised? In order to answer this question it is helpful to
isolate Deleuze’s three basic problems28 with phenomenology, which are the
following:
1. Phenomenology construes immanence in terms of a subject, and thus
fundamentally undermines it. This claim amounts to the charge that
phenomenology fails on its own grounds – fails, that is, to truly take account
of the immanence of thought and the subject. The more sophisticated version
of this argument is that even when phenomenology does not explicitly posit a
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transcendental ego, the subject who reflects is nevertheless at a distance from
the flux of pure immanence, not part of it.
2. Post-Husserlian phenomenology does not posit a transcendental ego or
subject, but does reinstate a form of transcendence within immanence, in the
form of a breach, gap, or disruption, within the field of immanence (on their
account, the flesh, the Other, etc.), which reinstates a hierarchy of Being. 
3. Phenomenology’s belief in an originary harmony between subject and
sensation constitutes an ur-doxa (it reinstates a higher form of common sense
as well as another kind of transcendence in immanence). 
We think it is clear enough that Merleau-Ponty could not justifiably be
challenged on the grounds of Deleuze’s first problem with phenomenology.
After all, his move in The Visible and the Invisible is explicitly away from a
philosophy of subjectivity to the ontological level. The human subject, like all
other beings, is a fold in the flesh of the world. If anything, Merleau-Ponty’s
philosophy constitutes a Herculean effort to divest the subject of its absolute
ontological transcendence, first vis-à-vis the turn to the body and then to the
milieu of Being. If an immanent theory of subjectivity simply holds that
subjectivity is structured and accounted for by a prior ontology, this also
applies to the later Merleau-Ponty. Moreover, instead of Deleuze’s talk of pre-
individual singularities and the plane of immanence, we have concepts that
play closely analogous roles: flesh, the chiasm, and wild-being. By not
construing immanence in terms of an immanence to a subject, his
phenomenology attains to the level of a more fundamental immanence. 
Of course, it needs to be reaffirmed that Deleuze and Guattari hold that
although there might not be a transcendental ego explicitly playing a role in
the phenomenologist’s work, they contend that the subject is nevertheless
inevitably distanced from immanence, or the ‘empirical flux’, rather than a
part of it. Although it must be acknowledged that Merleau-Ponty does say that
the subject is premised on a gap (écart), this divergence does not entail a kind
of transcendence in which the self and language are radically different from
the immanent flux of living. On the contrary, the phenomenon of habituality
and skilful coping within an environment is fundamental to Merleau-Ponty’s
understanding of the ‘body-subject’ from the time of Phenomenology of
Perception and before, just as Deleuze and Guattari have also emphasised that
the subject is nothing but a habit in a field of immanence. As Deleuze states
elsewhere, “We are habits, nothing but habits – the habit of saying ‘I’. Perhaps
there is no more striking answer to the problem of the Self” (ES x).29 On the
ontological level, for Merleau-Ponty subjectivity is also seen to derive from a
prior ontology of flesh and reversibility, and he insists that his proposed
‘hyper-dialectic’ is a situated thought that does not ignore its origins. By
implication, any ‘subject’ who engages in this kind of thinking is not distanced
from immanence, or considering immanence from a perspective external to it
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such as the transcendental subject – reflection cannot get us ‘outside’ for
Merleau-Ponty.
In relation to their second main objection against phenomenology, Deleuze
and Guattari’s reading of the flesh as a type of transcendence in immanence
has already been shown to be problematic. Of course, it must be acknowledged
that in earlier essays, such as ‘The Primacy of Perception’ and Phenomenology
of Perception, for example, Merleau-Ponty explicitly espoused a position that
he characterised as “transcendence in immanence” (PrP 16 and ff.), denying
the possibility of either pure immanence or pure transcendence. Similarly, his
use of the inscription from Paul Klée’s tomb – “I cannot be caught in
immanence” (PrP 188) – in “Eye and Mind” also seems to complicate our
attempt to draw his philosophy near to Deleuze’s. However, the key to
understanding such comments can be found in The Visible and the Invisible
where Merleau-Ponty explicitly comments that, “immanence and
transcendence are ontologically indistinguishable” (VI 89). By thus
identifying the two in this way only, we are cast back again into a univocal
realm where ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ no longer have any ontological value, being
rather states of affairs that come about in particular contexts, due to particular
intertwinings. Thus, what Merleau-Ponty calls and critiques as “pure
immanence” here is not the univocity of being that undergirds Deleuze’s
project, but the interiority espoused by Husserlian phenomenology (likewise,
“pure transcendence” would be a figure of absolute exteriority, such as that
proposed by the versions of scientism and empiricism famously attacked in
Phenomenology of Perception). Against Husserl, Merleau-Ponty’s point is that
the transcendent world cannot just be bracketed away. We are beings-in-the-
world, which ensures that there is an intertwining that obtains between the
transcendent (exterior, material) and the immanent (interior, conscious), thus
rejecting the possibility of complete phenomenological reduction to
immanence construed in the Husserlian sense of a reduction to consciousness.
In the ‘Preface’ to Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty famously
states that the most important lesson of the reduction is that it cannot be
completed (PP xiv), but what the reduction is able to reveal is something we
already knew, something disguised amidst the natural attitude and the ‘thesis
of the world’. In attempting the reduction, the ties that prevent it (that which
intertwines us with the world) are made all the more perspicacious, capable of
conceptualisation. We find that the “world and I are within one another”, and
that “things pass into us as well as we into the things” (VI 123). What
Merleau-Ponty’s consistent refrains regarding “transcendence in immanence”
mean then, is that if this intertwining of what has been designated as
transcendent and immanent is radical enough, then there are no longer
differences of kind between these aspects and this is exactly what his later
philosophical notions of reversibility and the chiasm sought to elaborate.
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Experience remains ambiguous in an ontological sense, at the intersection of
the abstractions that are transcendence and immanence. Given the ontological
proximity established earlier between Deleuze and Merleau-Ponty’s respective
concepts of flesh and the univocity of being, this casts a great deal of doubt on
the applicability of Deleuze’s second main problem with phenomenology to
the work of Merleau-Ponty. 
However, in the face of Deleuze’s third argument against phenomenology –
that it presupposes an Urdoxa – Merleau-Ponty’s position does have some
questions to answer. Essentially, these can be organised into two co-implicated
themes. First of all, even if Merleau-Ponty’s work does not involve a thought
of transcendence in Deleuze’s strong sense, do his references to the ‘natal
bond’ that holds between existents reinstate a form of Urdoxa, a happy
community or “profound intimacy” of existence that cannot be justified? And
secondly, do Merleau-Ponty’s well-known themes of the intrinsic
meaningfulness of experience and the perceptual faith not also presuppose a
kind of natural good sense that is more primordial than nonsense, thereby
inverting the ontological order of sense that Deleuze argues is the case? On the
one hand, then, there is a question about ontology, and on the other, about
meaningful phenomenological experience.
First of all, let us consider the ontological point. Although Merleau-Ponty
repeatedly resists any philosophy that proposes a coincidence or union
between body and world, it seems to us that the manner of their relation quite
frequently evinces a kind of intimacy. As Bernard Flynn puts it, in Merleau-
Ponty’s ontology being does not reveal itself across an interval of nothingness
but from a profound intimacy of body and world.30 While Flynn may push the
point a bit too far, ignoring the constitutive role of écart (divergence) in
Merleau-Ponty’s work, at various different points the postulation of a natural
harmony between beings is apparent. In The Visible and the Invisible, for
example, Merleau-Ponty uses terms that demonstrate this intimacy: natal
bond, natal secret, perceptual bond, pre-logical bond, or natal pact, are often
used to describe the relation between body and world, a relation which is also
said to be ‘naturally endowed with light’ (cf. VI 28, 32, 38, 136). As Peter
Dews comments, it might hence be said that Merleau-Ponty discusses the
perceived world in terms of a mode of “tenderness” (a philosophical theme
foreign to both structuralism and post-structuralism).31 It seems to us that this
intimacy, or this tenderness, cannot ultimately be justified, but some important
questions remain. Notably, is it an occasional aberration that mars an
otherwise radical new ontology, or is this tendency only justified in Merleau-
Ponty’s philosophy as an Urdoxa, a basic and unqualified presupposition that
makes possible all of what follows and rests upon it? 
This second, stronger claim, that his ontology of reversibility, flesh, etc., is
irremediably urdoxic, would run along the lines of the criticism levelled at
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Merleau-Ponty by Emmanuel Lévinas: that there is an unjustifiable affection
presupposed by the reversible ontology of The Visible and the Invisible.32
Although the most obvious register of Lévinas’ comment concerns
intersubjectivity, this is also a more general question for Merleau-Ponty’s
work. Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the entire self-world relation (since it
too is reversible and chiasmatic) might also be sustained by an unaccountable
affection. Now it is worth recalling again that Merleau-Ponty is very careful to
distance his ontology from proposing any kind of self-world fusion or union –
indeed, this is the point of the theme of the écart: while the reversibility of the
chiasm may indeed be the general manner of being that all beings express, this
chiasm is not, as Deleuze and Guattari suggested that it was, an, “ideal
coincidence” (WP 178). Of course, this does not vindicate Merleau-Ponty’s
presupposition of what he himself at one point calls a “pre-established
harmony” (VI 133) – a useful synonym for the urdoxic relation between good
and common sense. While doing away with the abstract tendencies that are
frequently involved in ontology, Merleau-Ponty’s occasional postulations of
an intrinsic harmony between beings returns us to a kind of Spinozan
substratum. However, instead of taking a substantial form (like Spinoza’s
infamous Deus sive Natura), in places Merleau-Ponty ends up supposing a
flawed and passive alternative; a unity of sense that supervenes on the
univocity that, for the most part, his philosophy of reversibility and the flesh
embraces. A form of the Urdoxa persists, in this way, in Merleau-Ponty’s
work, but while a harmony between self and world threatens Merleau-Ponty’s
account, and intervenes in concrete ways in his text, we are not convinced that
it is endemic to his ontology for reasons that have been enumerated throughout
this essay.
The second issue crystallises around the notion of perceptual faith in
Merleau-Ponty. Again, our question concerns how Merleau-Ponty can justify
this primordially meaningful relation between the self and the world. On the
surface, the general structure of the perceptual faith seems to be quite closely
related to the definition of Urdoxa given by Deleuze in the Logic of Sense. In
Merleau-Ponty’s early work, this faith is conceived as the ground of all
knowledge about the world, notably abstract intellectual knowledge. As is well
known, one of the great efforts in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as a whole is to
show how the cognitive level of intellectual activity is founded on a more basic
facility at the level of the lived body and its engagement with the world. In
Phenomenology of Perception, for example (eg. PP 355), Merleau-Ponty
appeals to a primordial faith to ground knowledge in the world. In other words,
we rely upon a non-cognised level of relation to the world before we know
anything more theoretically about it. In The Visible and the Invisible, however,
the perceptual faith takes a slightly different form. It is here described
precisely as a faith and not knowledge (VI 28). The perceptual faith is the
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naïve faith in the world that we have that resists our theses about it. Concepts
like subject and object transform the perceptual faith into cognitive
apparatuses, but for Merleau-Ponty, such categories cannot do justice to this
openness upon Being. But the important point to note about the perceptual
faith, especially in The Visible and the Invisible, is that it is paradoxical, and
that the paradox is generative. The paradox generates meaning, but meaning in
itself does not impute or necessitate harmony. Nor does this ‘meaningfulness’
of experience by itself attribute any specific content (easily, normatively, etc.)
to this immediate belief in the world. All of the attributes that Merleau-Ponty
ascribes to the perceptual faith – paradoxical, non-cognitive, resisting – are
enough to signal that we are no longer dealing with any kind of Husserlian pre-
established harmony of the objects of thought to thought itself. 
At the same time, the role of the perceptual faith in Merleau-Ponty’s work
is a serious question that cannot be easily dissipated. We might still ask
ourselves whether these complicating terms are by themselves enough to
exorcise the spectre of intrinsically meaningful experience that Deleuze takes
as one of the key elements of the Urdoxa, and this is especially so given that
for Merleau-Ponty the perceptual faith is univocally about the world in the first
place. However, given the extent to which Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy works
to undermine the problematic ties that hold between the transcendental ego
and the world in traditional phenomenology, it would be difficult to see here a
too great reliance on the Urdoxa in the doctrine of perceptual faith. In fact, this
theme could well be elaborated in terms more felicitous than Merleau-Ponty
himself does – along the lines of habituality, that concept so central to both his
and Deleuze’s account of the subject’s relation with the world. It is also worth
noting that Merleau-Ponty continually defines the perceptual faith as an
openness upon being (VI 88), a formulation that moves us back towards the
univocal ontology of the intertwining and away from the figure of the Urdoxa.
In sum, then, it would be more accurate to state that, as in the case of the theme
of the natal bond, Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of perceptual faith oscillates
between a fidelity to the intertwined and properly problematic experience of a
world that we are always already a part of, and, on occasion, a thematisation
of knowledge which would be naturally – doxically – ‘in step’ with the world
that it relates to.
6. Conclusion
In this essay we have attempted to show that here are some important
similarities evinced between the two philosophers in question, whatever their
apparent dissimilarities. We have tried to demonstrate, first of all, that
Deleuze’s criticisms of Merleau-Ponty are frequently off the mark. The latter
has moved phenomenology beyond the trap of judgement that threatened
Kant, and the archipelago of problems that surrounded Husserl and his
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conception of the supreme genetic power of the solipsistic ego cogito. Unlike
his contemporary Sartre, Merleau-Ponty did not pursue philosophy into the
speculative metaphysics that denudes phenomenology of its value; unlike
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty never retreated from the world of the everyday.
Secondly, we have tried to show the very similar ontological positions that
animate Merleau-Ponty and Deleuze. Despite Deleuze and Guattari’s
contentions that the ontological concept of the flesh remains indebted to
certain theological and transcendent presuppositions, it seems clear that this is
not the case. Thirdly, we have examined the extent to which Merleau-Ponty’s
work remains wed to a number of elements that abound in Western philosophy
which Deleuze groups under the title of Urdoxa. Ultimately, it seems to us that
although Merleau-Ponty resists the more insidious urdoxical elements of
phenomenology brought to light by Deleuze, he does occasionally reinstate an
ontological harmony. However, far from this being endemic to his ‘explicit’
ontology, it reveals the difficulty in remaining upon a plane of genuine
immanence: a difficulty that Deleuze and Guattari themselves note in their
final work (WP 51), and one that we must all vigilantly confront. It is
ultimately this plane of immanence, this attempt to make thought and life
intertwine, that both philosophers set as the horizons of philosophical activity. 
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